Private Property vs. National Sovereignty: A Matter of Scale

Libertarians generally argue that the state is wrong in controlling private property except where necessary to prevent direct violations of negative liberty on the grounds that private property is necessary for adequate freedom. However, private property can be used as a means of social control just as national sovereignty can, often to similar extents of control with similar origins, for private property are more alike than different except as a matter of scale.

Basically, the relevant similarities between the state and private property over land are so great that private property is effectively like a small scale state, and states are like property on larger scales even though states, like corporations I'd add, are controlled by many individuals.

It's therefore special pleading for libertarians to treat the state as if it had little or no right to control it's territory while treating treating owners of corporations and other private assets as possessing near absolute rights.

Consider some of the following similarities between private property and national sovereignty:

1.Origins: In the case of national sovereignty, an individual or group may find and claim territory as sovereign by finding it, stealing it, or bargaining for it. Likewise, individuals and groups may attain private property in the same manner. Also, private property may expand as state territory may expand.

2. Hierarchy: Just as sovereign state territory operates under a particular hierarchy with rules designating and regulating authority, so does private property. Private property could be controlled by a single individual or through complicated procedures and bylaws. Consider corporate stockholder conventions, corporate bylaws, and more generally, freedom of contract as examples of private hierarchy and institutional rules.

3. Control: Like sovereign states circumscribe personal conduct within their boundaries, so do private property owners within their property (e.g., a mall may restrict speech on its territory just as the state may limit speech within its territory). Even abstract institutions such as corporations and government agencies limit behavior of those operating within the institution or using the institution (e.g., a corporation may control its employees as a government agency does. Also, a government agency may stipulate the conditions and terms under which a citizen may use its services just as a corporation may). Further, the state regulates private property within its borders just as landlords and gated communities regulate the behavior of their tenants and their properties.

4. Interchangeability: Private property may become public property (e.g., through sale or confiscation) while public property may become private property (e.g., through privatization, sale, and, perhaps rarely, through force [e.g., consider past cases of mercenaries and private armies. The Dutch East India Company once had its own army]).

Please note that the previous list of similarities apply equally well to land as it does to more abstract entities (e.g., corporations share the same similarities listed above as agencies though their aims may vary).

Even today, overlap frequently exists between the private and public sectors. Privatization (e.g., school voucher programs, private prisons, private police, military contractors, etc.) and the use of public domain in service of business interests are examples of such overlap. Even where these sectors do not clearly overlap, striking similarities sometimes exist between private and public entities. For instance, oil companies act as keepers of the commons by claiming ownership over natural resources. One might also consider the case “innovators” who patent natural phenomena such as human genes (though one might reasonably argue that patents are still necessary to motivate discovery in such cases just as private property might be necessary to motivate oil drilling. However, I’m unsure of whether such incentives are truly necessary and would need to conduct more research before developing a sufficiently certain conclusion).

Private property does not obviously maximize personal liberty, at least private property as libertarians wish it to be defended from state intrusion. Privatization inevitably leads to corporatism when not reigned in. Once corporations are in power, they, like monopolies, have every incentive to raise prices and lower overhead costs. Rent seeking among business interests would only be worse once they operated all major government functions (e.g., tax collection, prisons, military, police, education, etc.). Libertarians obviously don't intend rent seeking to occur, but that would be the long-term consequence of full privatization in a libertarian state.

Further, even negative liberty requires physical resources in order to accomplish certain goals; negative liberty is valued not inherently but because of what ends it is used to accomplish.

Scale is what characterizes the primary differences between private and public institutions (while the private sector does not have its own dedicated police force, it can count on public law enforcement). “Scale” here refers quantitative differences in such features as land area, number of parties involved and relative authority (e.g., a landlord controls his apartments in which tenants live, but the larger and more powerful state regulates the landlord’s property).

In summary, private property and state institutions are more alike than different except as a matter of scale.

Equal Opportunity Causes Equal Outcomes

Oftentimes, people defend inequality, particularly economic inequality, on the basis that such inequality is justified by guaranteeing equal opportunity but not equal outcomes. However, the statement “equal opportunity doesn’t cause equal outcomes” is internally inconsistent.

Consider that opportunity is usually defined as a set of circumstances that makes it possible to do something, not including chance.

In this case, if one does not achieve something, then failure was the result of chance or lack of necessary circumstances for success.

Therefore, in practice failure and consequently inequality result from the lack of opportunity (equal economic opportunity means equal chances of economic success but without failure, meaning that there is economic equality).

Also, even if one rejects the overall claim as stated in this post's title, functionally equality of opportunity must be measured at least in part by measuring equality of outcomes (e.g., the more disproportionally group A excels than group B, the more likely it is, all else being equal, that group A enjoys more opportunities than group B).

Some might respond that unequal opportunity is acceptable provided that unequal opportunity derives from particular sources, particularly differences in personalities and behaviors. Here, debates over the existence, nature, and importance of freewill come to mind. However, freewill is a topic for another post.

Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 4: Of Specificity, Pragmatism, Choice, and Final Remarks)

Consider specificity. To hold beliefs at all we must rely on inherently ambiguous concepts. How do you define "truth"? What does it mean for something to be "true"? One might mean that true statements correspond to reality (i.e., the Correspondence Theory of Truth), but that's circular. Plus, what is "reality"? If we can't clearly define these terms, then we likely can't clearly define concepts such as "false," "objectivity," "probability," and so on.

I don't mean that "truth" is meaningless, nonexistent, or "relative" (whatever that means), but simply ambiguous and circular. Such ambiguity demonstrates limits of analytical philosophy. Humans want the universe to be remarkably less ambiguous than it is. We can form many guidelines for epistemological discourse but few formulaic rules. Objectivity is more intuitive than formulaic (this does not mean objectivity is not rational; rationality and intuition are not mutually exclusive [e.g., rationality maybe subconscious]). The world's incredibly detailed complexity force us to ignore some details, some of which maybe crucial to forming true beliefs. We have no choice but to generalize in answering most questions of reality's nature.

Consider pragmatism, specifically regarding objectivity. Objectivity is not always useful and sometimes counter-productive. For instance, optimism, which is rarely realistic, often motivates achievement of goals and improves personal happiness. In extreme situations, a "noble lie" maybe necessary to protect society's welfare (e.g., keeping battle plans secret while under attack). There are other examples but the general idea is obvious.
Consider Choice. You might not have a choice in what you believe or value. I personally don't believe freewill exists, but that's for another post.
Final Remarks. No doubt, I missed some crucial points, but I primarily intended to convey general ideas and didn't feel like writing a dissertation for each blog post.

The general ideas are these: you can't be consistent about everything, there are sometimes pragmatic reasons for being inconsistent, values are unknowable, faith is unavoidable in judging the empirical world, specificity has practical limits in increasing objectivity, and objectivity is not always practical. The main conclusion of these general ideas is that a coherent worldview is unattainable and impractical (by "practical," I mean tending to accomplish a certain goal).

By "coherent," I refer to a consistent worldview with full explanatory power.

There are degrees of coherence with some views such as that of libertarians being significantly more coherent than others. Coherence, in itself, however, is not a strength. If anything, too much coherence is a weakness since it is likely incorrect and impractical. A coherent worldview maybe completely wrong and counterproductive.

The following are unavoidable constraints on objectivity:

1. I don't know how objective I am, but am highly confident that most are not nearly as objective as they think. While there are degrees of objectivity, objectivity itself is rare in issues beyond the most basic commonsense. At best, I can hope to become more objective by questioning my beliefs and listening to what critics say.
2. I'm sure some of my beliefs are incorrect including some I'm sure of.
3. I'm sure some of my beliefs are contradictory.
4. I'm sure some of my beliefs will change.
5. I'm sure I have a huge cognitive blindspot of which I'm completely unaware.
   

The above constraints apply to everyone.

Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 3: Of Faith)

Theists often accuse atheists of relying faith in holding commonsense beliefs (e.g., the world is not flat, science is generally reliable, other people exist, etc.). Atheists respond by noting that the previous argument suffers from the tu quoque (or two wrongs) fallacy. Of course, they're both correct.

On one hand, beliefs about the empirical world ultimately depend on assumptions. On the other hand, there's no non-circular reason to favor some assumptions over other assumptions, rendering whatever conclusions one has arbitrary.

You can't question everything as a practical matter. If a child asks you why the sky's blue, then questions each of your answers, then what are you left with? If you re-trace your reasoning from conclusions to premises, you find a set of assumptions that you cannot defend or suffer circular reasoning. Doubt favors thinking over acting; faith favors acting over thinking.

Even science and commonsense mostly depend on faith:
There's no strong evidence you're not dreaming--lucid dreams occur. Nor is there much evidence other minds exist. The most serious example of faith in science is our trust in induction. Our acceptance of induction is an example of pragmatic faith. Philosopher Hans Reichenbach argues that induction is our best chance of forming reliable conclusions of the empirical world since induction will yield reliable conclusions if the universe is uniform, but no method will be reliable if the universe isn't uniform.

Almost all, if not all, faith is pragmatic, and not necessarily by serving the same goals. Religious faith helps people cope with hard times, optimism can motivate people, and faith in empiricism and induction offers a chance of forming true conclusions of the external world.

You can't avoid using faith even if logical axioms are self-evidently true. The only question is at what point in your reasoning you choose to apply faith. Like logic and observation, faith is another necessary tool for forming reliable conclusions.

If someone accepts an internally consistent position on faith, then no debate is possible.

Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 2: Of Values)

Aside from my issues with logic's usefulness, I also lack a coherent worldview because of my agnosticism on moral issues. What I mean is simply this: I do not whether moral rules exist just as an agnostic does not know whether God exists, and I would not know what the features of these moral rules would have if they did exist just as an agnostic would not whether God was the christian one or Muslim one if God existed.

For instance, I don't whether there is a correct moral theory, and if a moral theory did exist, I would not know whether it was utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, or something else entirely.

I do not even know if morality is relative because I don't know if moral rules exist at all.

The reason for my moral ignorance is straightforward: There is no evidence either which way. Almost all moral theories are entirely consistent. Empirical evidence does not resolve the issue--no one has found a way to derive moral propositions from empirical ones.

What could you possibly do to knowingly answer moral questions? Will you devise a mathematical proof? What about a scientific experiment? If findings from quantum science are any guide, we know that intuition is not a reliable guide to reality on its own. Then there's the fact people use emotion, intuition, faith--any method you can think of--to come to radically different moral conclusions. Whatever consensus philosophers may have could easily be the result of selection bias (e.g., utilitarians/deontologists/whatever are drawn to philosophy). Philosophy itself, interesting and stimulating as it is, I suspect is primarily ad hoc rationalization.

I neither know nor care what is moral nor do you know what is moral though you may think you do.

Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 1: Of Logic)

The main reason is because I understand the futility and uselessness of perfect consistency. Consistency generally leads to extremism, and I dislike extremism more than inconsistency.

Libertarians especially embody this obsession with consistency, often mistakenly conflating consistency with correctness, plausibility, or some other feature that makes an idea worth considering. Libertarians generally, like most people, fail to understand that you can be consistent and wrong. Your view could even be consistent with empirical data and incorrect depending on the nature of your assumptions.

Besides tending to promote extremism and not being a sufficient condition for truth, logical consistency has other weaknesses as well:

1. It is essentially unattainable given the world's complexity. Even with a few simple assumptions, there is the strong likelihood that at least one of the assumptions is wrong. A small unknown detail may contradict an entire worldview.
2. Consistency is often used to aid rationalization. Far from encouraging objectivity, one might simply use his knowledge of deductive reasoning (which is ultimately about preserving consistency) to develop premises that confirm his beliefs. Pure logic is not a sufficient condition for objectivity, and valid arguments are often unsound. In fact, arguments, in my experience, are usually weak not because they violate logical rules, but because they are based on false or questionable premises.

Some clarification is perhaps necessary. I do not accept that contradictions can true--I don't even know what that would mean--but believe that logic's usefulness is vastly overrated. While logical consistency is a necessary condition for the truth of a proposition, it is by no means a sufficient one. Plus, as a purely practical matter, philosophical consistency is unattainable given the world's sheer complexity and the fact that we do not even know what we do not know. Even if greater (though not necessarily perfect) consistency were possible, it might not be worth the hassle (e.g., suppose you had two or more beliefs that were individually plausible but mutually exclusive).

Given our practical limitations of being consistent, it seems likely to be in our interests to accept some degree of inconsistency in our beliefs. In this case, we would acknowledge that some of our beliefs our false but realize that we have little choice but to accept them all as true, at least for the moment (again, beliefs can be individually plausible but mutually exclusive).

Why Choice is Overrated

People often assume that more choice is always good, not matter how much we already have. However, a good rule of thumb is that everything carries diminishing returns. Consider these reasons, some discovered by psychologists, for why choice is overrated:

1. Too much choice makes us unhappy. Here, the social psychologist Barry Schwartz gives a 9 minute talk about his research findings on choice and happiness. Too many choices basically overwhelm us. Instead of settling on "good enough," we naturally pursue the best. We also tend to worry after making a choice since we wonder if the many other choices were better. We simply lack the brainpower to understand all our choices sufficiently to know what choice is best.
   
2. Too much choice makes us selfish. Having choice causes us to focus on our wants and needs rather than those of others.
3. Too much choice can hurt brand performance: "While regional and store brands are likely to benefit from longer product lines, the model suggests that big firms such as Procter & Gamble probably would be better off if they offered less variety."
   
4. Additional choices might not be better than the choices already available.
5. Additional choices might carry negative externalities. For example, new cars might come on the market with the most desirable car, from an individual perspective, having the most negative environmental impact.

It is far, far from self-evident that more choice is always better. In fact, we have far too much choice. This does not mean that more choice is always bad, but there is likely a balance between too much and too little choice.