Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 1: Of Logic)

The main reason is because I understand the futility and uselessness of perfect consistency. Consistency generally leads to extremism, and I dislike extremism more than inconsistency.

Libertarians especially embody this obsession with consistency, often mistakenly conflating consistency with correctness, plausibility, or some other feature that makes an idea worth considering. Libertarians generally, like most people, fail to understand that you can be consistent and wrong. Your view could even be consistent with empirical data and incorrect depending on the nature of your assumptions.

Besides tending to promote extremism and not being a sufficient condition for truth, logical consistency has other weaknesses as well:

1. It is essentially unattainable given the world's complexity. Even with a few simple assumptions, there is the strong likelihood that at least one of the assumptions is wrong. A small unknown detail may contradict an entire worldview.
2. Consistency is often used to aid rationalization. Far from encouraging objectivity, one might simply use his knowledge of deductive reasoning (which is ultimately about preserving consistency) to develop premises that confirm his beliefs. Pure logic is not a sufficient condition for objectivity, and valid arguments are often unsound. In fact, arguments, in my experience, are usually weak not because they violate logical rules, but because they are based on false or questionable premises.

Some clarification is perhaps necessary. I do not accept that contradictions can true--I don't even know what that would mean--but believe that logic's usefulness is vastly overrated. While logical consistency is a necessary condition for the truth of a proposition, it is by no means a sufficient one. Plus, as a purely practical matter, philosophical consistency is unattainable given the world's sheer complexity and the fact that we do not even know what we do not know. Even if greater (though not necessarily perfect) consistency were possible, it might not be worth the hassle (e.g., suppose you had two or more beliefs that were individually plausible but mutually exclusive).

Given our practical limitations of being consistent, it seems likely to be in our interests to accept some degree of inconsistency in our beliefs. In this case, we would acknowledge that some of our beliefs our false but realize that we have little choice but to accept them all as true, at least for the moment (again, beliefs can be individually plausible but mutually exclusive).