Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 4: Of Specificity, Pragmatism, Choice, and Final Remarks)

Consider specificity. To hold beliefs at all we must rely on inherently ambiguous concepts. How do you define "truth"? What does it mean for something to be "true"? One might mean that true statements correspond to reality (i.e., the Correspondence Theory of Truth), but that's circular. Plus, what is "reality"? If we can't clearly define these terms, then we likely can't clearly define concepts such as "false," "objectivity," "probability," and so on.

I don't mean that "truth" is meaningless, nonexistent, or "relative" (whatever that means), but simply ambiguous and circular. Such ambiguity demonstrates limits of analytical philosophy. Humans want the universe to be remarkably less ambiguous than it is. We can form many guidelines for epistemological discourse but few formulaic rules. Objectivity is more intuitive than formulaic (this does not mean objectivity is not rational; rationality and intuition are not mutually exclusive [e.g., rationality maybe subconscious]). The world's incredibly detailed complexity force us to ignore some details, some of which maybe crucial to forming true beliefs. We have no choice but to generalize in answering most questions of reality's nature.

Consider pragmatism, specifically regarding objectivity. Objectivity is not always useful and sometimes counter-productive. For instance, optimism, which is rarely realistic, often motivates achievement of goals and improves personal happiness. In extreme situations, a "noble lie" maybe necessary to protect society's welfare (e.g., keeping battle plans secret while under attack). There are other examples but the general idea is obvious.
Consider Choice. You might not have a choice in what you believe or value. I personally don't believe freewill exists, but that's for another post.
Final Remarks. No doubt, I missed some crucial points, but I primarily intended to convey general ideas and didn't feel like writing a dissertation for each blog post.

The general ideas are these: you can't be consistent about everything, there are sometimes pragmatic reasons for being inconsistent, values are unknowable, faith is unavoidable in judging the empirical world, specificity has practical limits in increasing objectivity, and objectivity is not always practical. The main conclusion of these general ideas is that a coherent worldview is unattainable and impractical (by "practical," I mean tending to accomplish a certain goal).

By "coherent," I refer to a consistent worldview with full explanatory power.

There are degrees of coherence with some views such as that of libertarians being significantly more coherent than others. Coherence, in itself, however, is not a strength. If anything, too much coherence is a weakness since it is likely incorrect and impractical. A coherent worldview maybe completely wrong and counterproductive.

The following are unavoidable constraints on objectivity:

1. I don't know how objective I am, but am highly confident that most are not nearly as objective as they think. While there are degrees of objectivity, objectivity itself is rare in issues beyond the most basic commonsense. At best, I can hope to become more objective by questioning my beliefs and listening to what critics say.
2. I'm sure some of my beliefs are incorrect including some I'm sure of.
3. I'm sure some of my beliefs are contradictory.
4. I'm sure some of my beliefs will change.
5. I'm sure I have a huge cognitive blindspot of which I'm completely unaware.
   

The above constraints apply to everyone.

Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 3: Of Faith)

Theists often accuse atheists of relying faith in holding commonsense beliefs (e.g., the world is not flat, science is generally reliable, other people exist, etc.). Atheists respond by noting that the previous argument suffers from the tu quoque (or two wrongs) fallacy. Of course, they're both correct.

On one hand, beliefs about the empirical world ultimately depend on assumptions. On the other hand, there's no non-circular reason to favor some assumptions over other assumptions, rendering whatever conclusions one has arbitrary.

You can't question everything as a practical matter. If a child asks you why the sky's blue, then questions each of your answers, then what are you left with? If you re-trace your reasoning from conclusions to premises, you find a set of assumptions that you cannot defend or suffer circular reasoning. Doubt favors thinking over acting; faith favors acting over thinking.

Even science and commonsense mostly depend on faith:
There's no strong evidence you're not dreaming--lucid dreams occur. Nor is there much evidence other minds exist. The most serious example of faith in science is our trust in induction. Our acceptance of induction is an example of pragmatic faith. Philosopher Hans Reichenbach argues that induction is our best chance of forming reliable conclusions of the empirical world since induction will yield reliable conclusions if the universe is uniform, but no method will be reliable if the universe isn't uniform.

Almost all, if not all, faith is pragmatic, and not necessarily by serving the same goals. Religious faith helps people cope with hard times, optimism can motivate people, and faith in empiricism and induction offers a chance of forming true conclusions of the external world.

You can't avoid using faith even if logical axioms are self-evidently true. The only question is at what point in your reasoning you choose to apply faith. Like logic and observation, faith is another necessary tool for forming reliable conclusions.

If someone accepts an internally consistent position on faith, then no debate is possible.

Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 2: Of Values)

Aside from my issues with logic's usefulness, I also lack a coherent worldview because of my agnosticism on moral issues. What I mean is simply this: I do not whether moral rules exist just as an agnostic does not know whether God exists, and I would not know what the features of these moral rules would have if they did exist just as an agnostic would not whether God was the christian one or Muslim one if God existed.

For instance, I don't whether there is a correct moral theory, and if a moral theory did exist, I would not know whether it was utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, or something else entirely.

I do not even know if morality is relative because I don't know if moral rules exist at all.

The reason for my moral ignorance is straightforward: There is no evidence either which way. Almost all moral theories are entirely consistent. Empirical evidence does not resolve the issue--no one has found a way to derive moral propositions from empirical ones.

What could you possibly do to knowingly answer moral questions? Will you devise a mathematical proof? What about a scientific experiment? If findings from quantum science are any guide, we know that intuition is not a reliable guide to reality on its own. Then there's the fact people use emotion, intuition, faith--any method you can think of--to come to radically different moral conclusions. Whatever consensus philosophers may have could easily be the result of selection bias (e.g., utilitarians/deontologists/whatever are drawn to philosophy). Philosophy itself, interesting and stimulating as it is, I suspect is primarily ad hoc rationalization.

I neither know nor care what is moral nor do you know what is moral though you may think you do.

Why I Lack A Coherent Worldview (Part 1: Of Logic)

The main reason is because I understand the futility and uselessness of perfect consistency. Consistency generally leads to extremism, and I dislike extremism more than inconsistency.

Libertarians especially embody this obsession with consistency, often mistakenly conflating consistency with correctness, plausibility, or some other feature that makes an idea worth considering. Libertarians generally, like most people, fail to understand that you can be consistent and wrong. Your view could even be consistent with empirical data and incorrect depending on the nature of your assumptions.

Besides tending to promote extremism and not being a sufficient condition for truth, logical consistency has other weaknesses as well:

1. It is essentially unattainable given the world's complexity. Even with a few simple assumptions, there is the strong likelihood that at least one of the assumptions is wrong. A small unknown detail may contradict an entire worldview.
2. Consistency is often used to aid rationalization. Far from encouraging objectivity, one might simply use his knowledge of deductive reasoning (which is ultimately about preserving consistency) to develop premises that confirm his beliefs. Pure logic is not a sufficient condition for objectivity, and valid arguments are often unsound. In fact, arguments, in my experience, are usually weak not because they violate logical rules, but because they are based on false or questionable premises.

Some clarification is perhaps necessary. I do not accept that contradictions can true--I don't even know what that would mean--but believe that logic's usefulness is vastly overrated. While logical consistency is a necessary condition for the truth of a proposition, it is by no means a sufficient one. Plus, as a purely practical matter, philosophical consistency is unattainable given the world's sheer complexity and the fact that we do not even know what we do not know. Even if greater (though not necessarily perfect) consistency were possible, it might not be worth the hassle (e.g., suppose you had two or more beliefs that were individually plausible but mutually exclusive).

Given our practical limitations of being consistent, it seems likely to be in our interests to accept some degree of inconsistency in our beliefs. In this case, we would acknowledge that some of our beliefs our false but realize that we have little choice but to accept them all as true, at least for the moment (again, beliefs can be individually plausible but mutually exclusive).